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NATO Defence Planning 
between Wales and Warsaw 
Politico-military Challenges of a Credible Assurance against Russia 
Rainer L. Glatz and Martin Zapfe 
The far-reaching measures agreed by NATO at the Alliance’s 2014 Summit in Wales 
substantially increase operational readiness but fall short in guaranteeing the security 
of all member states against Russia. The Alliance therefore faces difficult discussions 
before the next Summit in Warsaw in July 2016. Member states will have to improve 
capabilities and the operational readiness of their armed forces, which will come at 
a cost. Indefinitely avoiding the question of the role of nuclear weapons in defensive 
planning will not be possible. And finally, a credible assurance for the exposed Baltic 
States may not be feasible in the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. As a 
transitory step, compromises can be reached, perhaps in the form of establishing an 
extensive infrastructure for a substantial pre-positioning of materiel. In the absence 
of a fundamental improvement of NATO’s relationship with Russia, however, further 
measures will likely become necessary. 
 
Through the annexation of Crimea, consti-
tuting a clear contravention of international 
law, and its continuing support of separat-
ists in Eastern Ukraine, Russia has threat-
ened the foundations of the current peace-
ful European order. Moscow’s actions clearly 
violate the principles of the CSCE Final Act 
of 1975, which were further reaffirmed 
with the 1990 Charter of Paris – above all 
the principle of the inviolability of borders. 
NATO reacted to this new situation with its 
resolutions at the Summit in Wales in Sep-
tember 2014 and at the defence ministerial 
in June 2015. All these decisions have been 
conspicuously directed against an appar-
ently “revanchist” Russia and are intended 
to signal the Alliance’s determination. 
Since the Wales Summit, voices have 
gained prominence calling for an Allied 
policy to be based on the often cited dualism 
of the so-called Harmel Report of 1967 – 
deterrence through military strength and 
détente through political dialogue. Long-
term, the current radio silence between 
the Alliance and Russia is without question 
damaging to all participants. Should NATO 
nations wish to follow the logic of the Har-
mel Report, however, such a policy would 
have to be based on a thorough evaluation 
of the current politico-military situation. 
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Complex Threat Scenarios 
The Ukraine crisis has developed into a 
basic and fundamental crisis of confidence 
between the West and Russia. Above all, the 
annexation of Crimea has led many NATO 
and EU member states to conclude that in 
adopting methods of non-linear or “hybrid” 
warfare, Russia could attempt to destabilise 
not only Ukraine, but could also attempt to 
drive a wedge between the NATO members, 
stoking insecurity and undermining Alli-
ance guarantees. Ultimately, such methods 
risk permanently and dangerously blurring 
the line between peace and war. 
Under the label of “hybrid” threats, 
NATO’s defence planning is focusing on 
two well-known scenarios with fresh urgen-
cy. First, the Alliance fears that, by avoiding 
open aggression and thereby remaining 
below the threshold for Allied intervention, 
Russia could attempt to destabilise NATO 
member states, influence their internal 
political processes and thus, ultimately, 
render NATO’s security guarantee irrele-
vant. Second, concern has grown that Rus-
sia could be tempted to occupy exposed 
parts of the Alliance’s territory in a surprise 
attack and thus present NATO with a fait 
accompli before it can react. For three rea-
sons, both scenarios have relevance primar-
ily for the Baltic States: first, it is only here 
that former Soviet Union territories and 
that of present day NATO members overlap; 
second, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, 
there is considerable anxiety about internal 
instability given the large Russian-speaking 
population and, third, the Baltic is exposed 
geographically on the Alliance’s flank. 
The Wales Decisions 
Against this background, the political logic 
of the measures agreed upon in Wales be-
comes clear. The member states reached 
agreement on the establishment of a so-
called “Spearhead Force” (Very High Readi-
ness Joint Task Force, VJTF), the adaptation 
and expansion of its Multinational Corps 
Northeast in Szczecin (Poland), as well as 
the further development of the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) into the so-called En-
hanced NRF. The “NATO Readiness Action 
Plan” (RAP) is based on the dualism of 
“assurance measures”, which emphasise 
the solidarity of the Alliance, and “adapta-
tion measures” focussing on the reform 
of NATO. Finally, the heads of state and 
government of NATO member states pledged 
a future increase of their defence budgets 
and investment quotas. 
While the assurance measures are in-
tended to underline Allied solidarity with 
the exposed eastern member states and 
the indivisibility of security on NATO’s ter-
ritory, the adaptation measures have far 
greater long-term significance, as they aim 
at adapting the military command and con-
trol capabilities of NATO and increasing its 
rapid reaction capabilities. 
Assurance measures 
In the context of assurance measures pub-
lic attention focussed initially on the ex-
pansion and intensification of military 
exercises in eastern member states, as well 
as the essentially symbolic, time-limited de-
ployment of military units. Allied AWACS 
aircraft are conducting an increased num-
ber of surveillance flights over NATO’s 
eastern territory, and naval units are tem-
porarily showing presence in the Baltic and 
Black Sea. Another part of the package of 
measures has been to increase the number 
of aircraft conducting air policing over the 
Baltic States. However, in September 2015, 
the Alliance once again reduced the num-
ber of these fighter jets. 
In addition to those multilateral mea-
sures, NATO individual member states are 
free to go beyond the Alliance’s steps to 
demonstrate their even greater determina-
tion. Accordingly, the USA has decided on 
steps which go beyond NATO’s commit-
ment and which are components of the 
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) an-
nounced by President Barack Obama in 
June 2014. The resources provided for the 
ERI have enabled the USA both to maintain 
a continual rotational unit presence, main-
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ly in Poland and the Baltic States, and to in-
crease the number of bilateral exercises. A 
prominent example is the “Dragoon Ride” 
of March 2015 that aroused much attention 
in the media. During this exercise, units 
of a US cavalry regiment conducted a long 
road march through eastern member states 
with armoured combat vehicles. Further-
more, US fighter aircraft were deployed to 
the region on a rotational basis. In parallel, 
and in response to an increase in flights 
by Russian bombers, the US Air Force con-
ducted a small number of strategic bomber 
flights from bases in Great Britain. 
As the ERI was ultimately aimed at ex-
ploring the possibilities for the forward 
stationing of equipment, it did not come as 
a surprise that, during his European trip in 
June 2015, US Secretary of Defence Ashton 
Carter announced the pre-positioning of 
approximately 250 armoured vehicles in 
Central and Eastern Europe. For the first 
time, some of this military equipment will 
be stationed in the territories of the “new” 
NATO nations: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, with other 
elements in Germany as well. In total, this 
materiel of the so-called European Activity 
Set (EAS) will serve to equip a Heavy Brigade 
Combat Team (HBCT) of up to 5,000 sol-
diers, both for exercises in the context of 
the rotating presence and for deployments 
in the region. 
Adaptation measures 
The less visible yet far more significant part 
of the Wales decisions is directed at the re-
organization of NATO structures and instru-
ments. A key aim of NATO’s Readiness Action 
Plan is to considerably improve the rapid 
reaction capability of the NRF. Based on a 
decision at the NATO defence ministerial in 
June 2015, its size is to be increased from 
19,000 soldiers to 40,000. In addition, the 
VJTF is being set up as a joint and combined 
“Spearhead Force” of the highest readiness, 
with a strength of approximately 5,000 sol-
diers. The setting up of an interim VJTF as 
a transitional step, intended to serve as a 
partial trial of the concept, was successfully 
concluded under the command of 1 (Ger-
man/Netherlands) Corps. The VJTF is to be 
deployable within a few days after notifica-
tion to react rapidly to security challenges 
and thus raise the deterrent effect of NATO’s 
force posture. In order to achieve this, the 
Readiness Action Plan also includes the 
establishment, already underway, of eight 
permanent, multinational reception bases 
(NATO Force Integration Units) in the Baltic 
States, as well as in Poland, Romania, Bul-
garia, Hungary and Slovakia. Beyond per-
manently increasing the staff of the Ger-
man-Danish-Polish multinational corps 
headquartered in Szczecin (Poland), NATO 
is continually striving to show presence in 
the East. For this, NATO is operating with 
the formula of “persistent presence”, imply-
ing a continual presence of NATO units for 
joint and combined exercises and training, 
but on a rotational basis, and not as 
integral combat units. 
On the whole, the NATO measures de-
scribed above, combined with those of 
individual member states, refrain from an 
open break with the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act of 1997 and shy away from a “permanent 
stationing of substantial combat forces”. 
While this reflects the primacy of political 
concerns and is a legitimate restriction, 
this basic decision leads to considerable 
challenges with regard to the implemen-
tation of the Wales decisions at a military 
level. 
Implementing the Wales Decisions 
Since 2014, NATO has been steadily im-
plementing the decisions taken in Wales. 
Not least because of their visibility, the 
public focus rests largely on the increased 
number and scope of exercises. In 2014, 
NATO conducted 162 exercises, double the 
number originally planned. Added to these 
were another 40 exercises conducted at 
national levels. For 2015, around 270 exer-
cises had been planned, of which about a 
half were intended to reassure the eastern 
European allies. 
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Far more important, however, have been 
NATO’s efforts to adapt its structures and 
planning in order to increase operational 
readiness. Militarily, the Alliance is concen-
trating on setting up the “Spearhead Force” 
agreed upon in Wales. Here, considerable 
challenges are becoming increasingly visible, 
mostly due to the fact that a continuous 
forward stationing of NATO combat forces 
has thus far been avoided. 
Ultimately, the VJTF’s core function is 
that of a “mobile tripwire” on the Alliance’s 
borders. The “Spearhead Force” derives its 
significance from its character as a rapidly 
deployable guarantee of Alliance solidarity, 
which should make it difficult for Moscow 
to attack an individual eastern member 
state without likewise striking other allies. 
NATO therefore has ambitious plans for the 
advance units of the VJTF. They are to be 
ready to move within two to five days after 
being alerted. The main follow-on forces 
are to be ready for deployment within five 
to seven days. In the absence of forward-
stationed combat units, the core function 
as a “mobile tripwire” fundamentally re-
quires a rapid and assured deployment of 
the VJTF. 
With regard to rapid deployability, politi-
cal and logistical hurdles are appearing. 
Politically, NATO states would first have to 
consent to an activation of the VJTF, which 
is anything but certain. Under these circum-
stances, the decision to carefully empower 
the NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR) in this process is an im-
portant step. However, improving the 
Alliance’s capabilities in selected areas still 
seems to be necessary, particularly concern-
ing intelligence, surveillance and recon-
naissance (ISR), situational awareness and 
early warning capabilities. 
Yet even after a potential decision by 
the NATO Council on a deployment of the 
VJTF and early activation by the SACEUR, 
the Alliance would quickly meet logistical 
hurdles. It would struggle to field the neces-
sary strategic transport aircraft vital to any 
such deployment. Fundamentally, NATO 
would be dependent on US support and 
capabilities. In this matter, the commander 
of NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command 
Brunssum, General Hans-Lothar Domröse, 
spoke of a considerable dependency on 
American air transport. As Domröse put it 
in a public lecture, the deployment of the 
VJTF alone and by air would require 450 
flights by C-17 heavy strategic transport 
aircraft. As for overland transport, exercises 
have shown that the infrastructural, regu-
latory and planning prerequisites for stra-
tegic troop movements, often taken for 
granted during the Cold War, are practical-
ly non-existent. 
These logistical hurdles will only grow 
during those years when a southern Euro-
pean NATO partner will be in command of 
the VJTF, as distances will increase accord-
ingly. Thus far, scepticism vis-à-vis NATO’s 
ambitious plans seems entirely appropriate: 
it was the current chairman of the NATO 
Military Committee, Czech General Petr 
Pavel, who was quoted in his country’s 
media as saying that Russia was capable of 
occupying the Baltic States within two days, 
whilst the NATO states would be in no posi-
tion to react to the situation. 
Just as significant – and so far not suffi-
ciently discussed in public – is the question 
as to whether deployability would also be 
assured. If the Russian military wanted to 
prevent a NATO deployment to threatened 
regions at its flanks, would NATO would be 
in a position to deploy the VJTF nonethe-
less? This applies in particular to the Baltic. 
According to the US Army Europe, modern 
anti-ship missiles SSC-5 and SA-21 air 
defence systems stationed in the Russian 
enclave of Kaliningrad would enable Russia 
to effectively cover the Baltic Sea and reach 
well into Polish air space. It must therefore 
be assumed that Russia would indeed be 
capable of effectively blocking the air and 
sea routes into the Baltic states if it so 
wished. Whether NATO would be capable 
and willing to force a deployment of the 
VJTF against a Russian strategy of anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD), is more than 
questionable, especially as further escala-
tion would seem unavoidable in this case. 
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Of course, whether Russia itself would opt 
for such an escalation, with attendant re-
percussions at the strategic level, likewise 
remains an open question. 
These considerations with regard to the 
VJTF at the same time highlight the limits 
on the potential use of the whole NRF, 
supposed to be a sufficiently robust corps-
strength force of up to 40,000 soldiers. 
Whereas the VJTF would be primarily effec-
tive through its symbolic “tripwire” func-
tion, for the NRF, as NATO’s “second wave” 
in case of conflict, real-world combat effec-
tiveness would be of utmost importance. 
Here too, NATO is faced with a major chal-
lenge. In the last decades, the level of the 
corps, once the backbone of NATO’s mili-
tary planning, has either become operation-
ally irrelevant or even entirely disbanded. 
Just increasing the staff of a corps head-
quarters by itself does not automatically 
lead to higher operational readiness of the 
entire corps. To reach that aim, the Alliance 
has to answer important questions, inter 
alia about the assigned combat divisions 
and brigades, the permanent corps troops 
(that is, integral support units directly 
attached to the corps headquarters) as well 
as the peacetime deployment and exercises 
of its subordinate units. Additionally, in the 
medium term, even an NRF in the strength 
of a corps – with doubtful operational read-
iness – might not suffice. According to US 
sources, Russian snap exercises close to its 
border involved up to 150,000 soldiers. 
Naturally, these figures are to be regarded 
with caution. Credible reports on the ef-
forts of the Russian army to sustain even 
comparatively small combat task forces in 
Ukraine put Russian capabilities into con-
text. However, it cannot be excluded that 
NATO may have to considerably adjust its 
force posture over the medium term. 
Another level of complexity is added 
through the decision to establish the VJTF 
on the basis of annually rotating national 
units. This composition of the VJTF will 
effectively force NATO to organise an annu-
al rotation of different units from various 
NATO nations for identical operational 
areas, including, most critically, the pre-
positioning of necessarily differing equip-
ment and materiel. This will be difficult 
to sustain in the long term. Ultimately, 
the plan to have member states supplying 
troops to the VJTF and the NRF on an an-
nual and rotational basis, combined with 
the costly pre-positioning of materiel in 
situ, is highly problematic. 
More than one year after Wales, and 
despite tremendous efforts, it is becoming 
clear that the compromises which underlie 
the institutional reforms of the Alliance – 
the rejection of the forward defence strate-
gy, the annual rotation of the troop-con-
tributing nations, the renunciation of units 
permanently subordinate to the multina-
tional corps – may well lead to considerable 
difficulties in the implementation. Taken 
together, these measures cannot sufficiently 
contribute to a credible deterrence toward 
Moscow and a reassurance of the eastern 
member states in both threat scenarios 
described above – subversion and coup de 
main. 
Before Warsaw – 
Three Central Questions 
Thus, to counter the Russian challenge, 
NATO is facing three central decisions in 
the run-up to the Warsaw Summit. First, 
it will have to determine whether the dete-
rioration in relations with Russia will con-
tinue for a sustained period – and whether, 
if the answer is yes, a “deterrence from a 
distance” through the current configura-
tions of the VJTF and the NRF will be suffi-
cient. Second, it will have to touch the sen-
sitive issue of the nuclear dimension, 
which, so as not to disturb efforts towards 
a détente with Russia has been almost com-
pletely neglected (at least publicly). Third, 
facing at best stagnating national defence 
budgets and an ongoing lack of military 
capabilities, the member states will have to 
focus on the operational readiness of their 
respective armed forces. All these topics 
would severely tax the consensus of Wales 
and are likely to strain NATO solidarity. 
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First of all, it is already evident today 
that the Alliance will be confronted with 
renewed and unequivocal demands on the 
part of the Polish hosts and the Baltic States 
to provide credible and tangible tokens of 
Allied solidarity. Just as the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany insisted on the permanent 
presence of Allied combat forces on its soil, 
today these states want to see the security 
guarantee of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty 
materialised in the form of permanently 
stationed NATO units. 
Thus, the question may well arise as 
to how the concept of a “forward defence” 
could be designed, should the Alliance 
adopt such a strategy, in a way that the de-
sired goal of deterrence could be achieved 
with minimal risk of escalation. Any effec-
tive multinational presence would in 
essence mirror the logic of the Allied pre-
sence in Germany during the Cold War – 
that is, the tiered presence of German and 
allied corps – as a guarantee for allied soli-
darity and assurance against a surprise 
attack on one single ally. Of course, such 
a concept is not transferable to the Alli-
ance’s entire eastern border. However, with 
regard to the Baltic, a permanent presence 
of multinational combat units is indeed 
possible. These forces would have to possess 
sufficient combat effectiveness to delay the 
opposing forces, in the unlikely event of an 
attack, until allied reinforcements arrive, 
while being organically multinational in 
order to ensure an Allied reaction. 
In the long term, the desired multi-
nationality and the required combat effec-
tiveness will only be achieved in combi-
nation if the principle of national rotation 
is given up, and if concrete multinational 
areas of operations for the respective 
units are designated. This, combined with 
the non-assured Allied capability to deploy 
troops in time and against resistance, 
couldalso mean that the NRF should be 
structured and deployed in a way that 
would enable them to credibly reinforce 
the permanently present forces, thereby 
critically contributing to their deterrence 
value. 
Even if, in the long term, a credible 
deterrence seems not feasible on the basis 
of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO has 
every incentive to strive for a “minimally 
invasive” break with the Founding Act, in 
order to signal that it harbours no offensive 
intentions against Russia whatsoever. De-
spite considerable difficulties, this could 
prove possible. Elements of such an agreed 
“non-offensive operational defence” (“struk-
turelle operative Nichtangriffsfähigkeit”) could 
be keeping mechanised forces to a mini-
mum, maintaining a logistical base insuffi-
cient for offensive operations or designing 
exercise scenarios of an obviously defensive 
nature. In addition, NATO should consider 
how tried and tested arms control mecha-
nisms, in particular with regard to con-
fidence-building measures, could be revital-
ised in the context of the OSCE, in order to 
reduce the risk of dangerous surprises – for 
example, through the presence of Russian 
observers. Similar concepts have already 
been discussed intensively during the Cold 
War. In the long term, these and compa-
rable measures could be the basis for a real-
istic linking of détente and deterrence, 
evenunder the circumstances of a forward 
defence strategy. 
Should the Warsaw Summit fail to agree 
on a permanent presence in the Baltic, a 
transitional compromise could be found in 
establishing an adequate infrastructure for 
the substantial pre-positioning of materiel. 
In principle, this could be a feasible option, 
as it would significantly reduce the logis-
tical challenges of rapid deployment and 
consequently improve NATO’s rapid reaction 
capability. Whether this concept of pre-posi-
tioned materiel without an accompanying 
and permanent presence of multinational 
combat units can ultimately develop suffi-
ciently effective deterrence and reassurance, 
however, remains to be seen. In the short 
term, such a compromise thus seems fea-
sible. Without a fundamental détente in 
relations with Moscow, however, it would 
be difficult to sustain in the long run. 
Whatever the agreement in Warsaw, 
no military planning for the Baltic can per-
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manently ignore the essential interaction 
of conventional and nuclear planning. Thus 
far, NATO member states have avoided 
touching the sensitive issue openly. Despite 
the current uncertainty about the actual 
status of Russian nuclear doctrine, Russian 
nuclear weapons seem to be potentially 
relevant to the Alliance’s own planning on 
two levels: on the one level as an abstract 
background threat and symbols of state 
power, against which Russia could politi-
cally influence NATO member states: on 
the other, and more relevant, as a deterrent 
against conventional follow-up operations 
by NATO after a coup de main against the 
Baltic. Beyond those two scenarios, Russia’s 
nuclear arsenal appears to be primarily of 
defensive value for Moscow, compensating 
for a continuing position of qualitative 
inferiority vis-à-vis NATO. 
Thus, a pure focus on conventional re-
assurance would neglect the critical inter-
dependence of conventional and nuclear 
planning. However, for two understandable 
reasons, Alliance does not have any interest 
in a public debate of this topic: first, within 
the Alliance there are diverging positions on 
the relevance and doctrinal role of nuclear 
weapons. And, second, at a certain point, 
these discussions could even question the 
INF Treaty of 1987 on the stationing of inter-
mediate range nuclear ballistic and cruise 
missiles in Europe – and thereby touch a 
cornerstone of nuclear stability in Europe. 
Thus NATO’s caution is well founded. It 
does not want to put the political consen-
sus from Wales at risk and at the same time 
disrupt efforts of nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation. However, below the 
highest political levels, an intense debate 
seems to be getting track and could come 
to the surface before Warsaw. 
Ultimately, increased operational readi-
ness on NATO’s part is only a function of 
the operational readiness of its national 
armed forces – and this leads to questions 
extending far beyond the NRF and VJTF. 
NATO therefore faces a renewed debate 
as to whether, after decades of continual 
reduction of the size of national armies – 
and, specifically, of the US Army in Europe 
– often resulting in a loss of capabilities, a 
reversal of the trend is needed. The coopera-
tion framework of “Smart Defence”, agreed 
in 2012 at the NATO Summit in Chicago and 
shaped by the financial crisis, and compa-
rable initiatives, will not suffice to compen-
sate for this qualitative loss. 
In the end, NATO’s security guarantee 
will neither be credible nor sustainable 
without a qualitative improvement of its 
component national armed forces. Respec-
tive efforts should focus primarily on im-
provements within the existing structures. 
Decisions in the German Federal Defence 
Ministry to increase the number of main 
battle tanks, and to work towards equip-
ping army divisions at 100 percent of the 
authorized strength point in the right 
direction. However, even if qualitative im-
provement is quite rightly at the forefront, 
certain parts of the armed forces might also 
see a quantitative increase as well. 
This will not be without cost. In Wales, 
the heads of state and government made a 
non-binding pledge to halt the reduction 
in defence budgets and to spend at least 
two percent of the respective gross domes-
tic product on defence by the end of the 
next decade. Whether this target will be 
achieved is doubtable. However, should 
the member states refrain from substantial 
steps, increasing their military capabilities 
and, ultimately, finding a credible deter-
rent would barely be achievable. Further-
more, European NATO members would also 
be liable to face another “burden sharing” 
debate with the USA. And without the 
latter’s military capabilities, in particular 
without its critical force enablers, NATO 
could not hope to achieve the level of opera-
tional readiness necessary in any scenario. 
A view to the South 
In principle, a dialogue with the Russian 
government on the basis of détente and 
deterrence seems possible and sensible. 
Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the 
“deterrence” aspect of this equation is 
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credible, important questions need to be 
answered, the responses to which appear 
to lie beyond the Wales consensus. Not all 
these questions will be answered in War-
saw; but the Alliance will not escape any 
of them in the long term unless relations 
with Russia fundamentally improve. 
Although this analysis has restricted 
itself to measures vis-à-vis Moscow, the im-
plications of basic operational readiness 
of NATO’s armed forces go beyond the chal-
lenge from the East, particularly with a 
view to the Alliance’s troubled southern 
flank in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Should the political leadership of NATO’s 
member states, in the event of further 
destabilisation on NATO’s periphery, decide 
on a comprehensive and sustained military 
intervention in this region, this would prob-
ably not be possible without a sustained 
increase in military operational readiness. 
Thus, the Warsaw Summit could be an im-
portant milestone. 
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